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§1   Introduction
Among types of political system, the one most identified in contemporary western
society with the production of justice is democracy.  Even on the political left, democracy
has largely replaced socialism as the regime desideratum.  Just as those socialists who
were dissatisfied with aspects of Soviet society claimed that the Soviet regime was not
real socialism, so those who continue to be dissatisfied with, for example, the American
system, now argue that it is not an instance of real democracy.  Real democracy is
thought to be a political system in which genuine representation of all citizens – and even
justice – is achieved.
The identification of democracy with justice is not simply a practice of many
political theorists: perhaps the most important aspect of political transformation in the
world in the last fifty years has been the toppling of authoritarian regimes, and their
replacement with democratic ones.  Just as socialism was a powerful movement in the
first half of the twentieth century – by 1950, fully one-third of the world’s peoples lived
under regimes that described themselves as socialist – so democracy has been the
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Scarf for teaching me how to solve infinite-dimensional optimization problems without
recourse to optimal control theory.   John Geanakoplos, Joaquim Silvestre, and Karine Van
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massively appealing political doctrine in the period since 1960. And as it was an error
of socialists to identify socialism with All Good Things, so now it is an error of
democrats to identify democracy with All Good Things
1.  The most common example of
this fallacy is when some say that regime X cannot be a democracy, because it sustains
Bad Thing Y (oppression of women, abrogation of civil rights, etc.). But if democracy is
defined as a set of political institutions, rather than as an ethos, then the correct approach
is to study what those institutions entail.  Perhaps, for example, both the oppression of
women and its absence can co-exist with democracy.
In this article, I undertake a study of this kind and ask whether democracy,
understood as a system of political competition between parties that represent different
coalitions of citizens,  will engender  economic equality.  I focus upon the role of
education as an instrument for reducing the differentials in human capital that would
otherwise obtain, and  ask whether democracy  will entail the long-term equalization of
human capital through political decisions concerning educational investment.
We model the following society, one which reproduces itself over many
generations.  At the initial date, there are households led by adults (parents) characterized
by a distribution of human capital, that is, capacities to produce income.  Each parent has
one child.  The human capital the child will have, when next period he has become an
adult, is a monotone increasing function of his parent’s level of human capital and the
                                                                                                                                                          
1 There are many people who identify democracy with justice.  For instance, Adolfo Perez
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amount that is invested in his education.   This relationship is deterministic, and describes
the educational production function for all children. Thus, more investment is needed to
bring a child from a poor (low human capital) family up to a given level of human capital
than a child from a richer family.  All parents have the same utility function:  a parent
cares about her household’s consumption (that is, her after-tax income), and the earning
power her child will have, as an adult.  We will, for simplicity, assume that adults do not
value leisure.
Educational finance is, until section 5, purely public.  The polity of adults, at each
date, must make four political decisions: how much to tax themselves, how to split the
tax revenues between a redistributive budget for households’ current consumption and
the educational (investment) budget, how to partition the budget for redistribution among
adults, and how to target the educational budget to investment in particular children,
according to their type (that is, their parents’ human capital).  Once these political
decisions are implemented, a distribution of human capital is determined for the next
generation.  When the present children become adults, characterized by that distribution
of human capital, they face the same four political decisions.  We wish to study the
asymptotic distribution of human capital of this dynamic process.
In the society we have described, a child is characterized by the family into which
he is born, for his capacity to transform educational investment into future earning power
is determined by his family background, proxied by his parent’s human capital.  We
imagine that the transmission of ‘culture’ to the child is indicated by the parent’s human
capital endowment.    The child’s capacity successfully to absorb educational investment,
and transform it into human capital, as a circumstance beyond his control, and so a4
society of this kind that wished rapidly to equalize opportunities for all children would
compensate children from poorer families with more educational investment.  Equality of
opportunity will be achieved when all adults have the same human capital, for that
means, as children in the previous generation, the compensation for disadvantageous
circumstances was complete
2.  In the real world, equality of opportunity does not require
equalizing outcomes in this way, because people may remain responsible for some aspect
of their condition, even after the necessary compensation for disadvantage has been
made.  But in our model there is no such element of personal responsibility, and so, if we
take equality of opportunity as our conception of justice, then justice will have been
achieved exactly when the wage-earning capacities of all adults are equal.
One might object that it is here sufficient to equalize (post-fisc) incomes for
justice.  But it may well be the case that individuals derive welfare not only from
consumption, but from their human capital, and so we insist that this more demanding
condition of human-capital equality is the one of interest.   Indeed, if one’s human capital
is an enabler of self-realization, then it is surely the case that justice would require a
concern with levels of human capital in a society, not simply income levels.
We will stipulate a democratic process for solving society’s political problems, at
each generation.  Our question becomes:  How close will the asymptotic distribution of
human capital engendered by this democratic process be to an equal distribution?
The focus of our model will be on that democratic process.  We employ a concept
of democratic political equilibrium that takes as data the distribution of preferences of the
polity over a given policy space, and produces as output an endogenous partition of the
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polity into two political parties, a policy proposal by each party, and a probability that
each party will win the election.  We suppose that an election occurs, and the policy of
the victorious party is implemented.  Our procedure will be to begin with a distribution of
adult human capital at date 0, which will determine the distribution of adult preferences
at date 0, and  initialize the stochastic dynamic process.
Although we have described the political choice as consisting of four independent
decisions, we will in fact model the political problem as one on an infinite dimensional
policy space.  That policy space, denoted T, will consist of pairs of real-valued functions
(, ) y r  where y() h  is the after-tax household income of an adult with human capital h,
and rh ()  is the public educational investment in a child from a family where the parent
has human capital h.  These functions are restricted only to be continuous, to jointly
satisfy a budget constraint, and to satisfy an upper and lower bound on their derivatives,
when the derivatives exist.  Thus, the present analysis marks a substantial technical
advance over analyses in political economy that must limit their scope to unidimensional
policy spaces, or policy spaces of small dimension.  I argue that the advance is not merely
technical.  It is surely artificial to restrict a democratic polity’s choice of policies to ones
with simple mathematical properties, such as linearity.  Our ability to solve the political
problem with no such restrictions means that we are able to model the democratic
struggle as ruthlessly competitive: no holds, in the sense of unmotivated restrictions on
the nature of policy proposals, are barred.
                                                                                                                                                          
for disadvantageous circumstances.6
Indeed, we show below that the analysis on a policy space of large dimension
gives qualitatively different results from the standard, uni-dimensional Hotelling-Downs
analysis.
The political equilibrium concept is ‘party unanimity Nash equilibrium with
endogenous parties (PUNEEP)’  In two recent articles, I introduced the concept of ‘party
unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE), (Roemer [1999, 1998]).  The extension to ‘PUNE
with endogenous parties’ is introduced in Roemer (2001, Chapter 13).  The endogenous-
party aspect is grafted from a model of Baron (1993).
It is probably fair to say that most articles in political economy propose a
relatively sophisticated model of the economy, and a trivial model of politics (standardly,
political equilibrium consists in both parties’ proposing the median voter’s ideal point, or,
more generally, a Condorcet winner in the policy space).  Our approach here is just the
opposite: the economy is very simple, but the politics are quite complex.  Our first
justification for this complexity is that, without it, we cannot solve the problem of
political equilibrium with multi- and even infinite dimensional policy spaces, when
Condorcet winners do not exist.   Our second justification, for the problem at hand, is that
our focus is upon the workings of democracy, and therefore, a careful articulation of
democratic institutions is appropriate.  Of course, a more highly articulated model of the
economy would also be desirable, if tractability were not sacrificed.
In section 2, the definition of political equilibrium that we will use, and a
companion concept of quasi-equilibrium, are presented.  In section 3, we characterize the
policies in the political equilibria of the model.  Section 4 studies the dynamics.  Section
5 relaxes the assumption that all educational investment is public.  Section 6 analyzes the7
dynamics of income distribution in a unidimensional, median-voter model.  Section 7
presents some simulations of dynamics.  Section 8discusses the results, and concludes.
All proofs of propositions are gathered in the appendix.
§2 Party unanimity Nash equilibrium with endogenous parties (PUNEEP)
In this section, I define PUNEEP and a related concept
3.
Let H be a set of voter types, where hH Œ is distributed according a to
probability measure F in the society in question.  Let T be a set of policies.  There is a
function vT H : ¥Æ R which represents the preferences of types over policies; thus
vh (, ) ◊  is the utility function of type h on T.  For each h, we assume that vh (, ) ◊  is a von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function for lotteries on T.
Let tt T
12 , Œ  be two policies; we next define p(, ) tt
12, the probability that policyt
1
defeats policy t
2.  Our datum is a function p
*:[ , ] [ , ] 01 01 Æ , such that pp
** () , () , 0011 ==
and p
* is strictly increasing on [0,1].
Let W(, ) tt
12 be the set of types who prefer tt I t t
12 1 2  to    and   ( , )be the set of types
who are indifferent between tt
12  and  .  Then we define, pro tem
4:
pp (, )( ((,) )( (, ))).
* tt tt Itt
12 12 12 1
2
=+ FF W (2.1)
In other words, FF ((,) ) ( (,) ) W tt Itt
12 12 1
2
+  is the mass of voters who in principle
will vote for t
1 — but perhaps some voters will make mistakes or perhaps F is measured
                                                   
3 For a more relaxed and carefully motivated presentation of PUNE and PUNEEP, see Roemer
(2001, Chapters 8 and 13).
4 To be modified in Remark 2, below.8
imperfectly.  Equation (2.1) says that the probability that t
1 defeats t
2 is an increasing
function of the ‘expected’ vote for t
1.
A party structure is a partition of H into two elements.  We specialize, now, to
the case H = + R , and further specialize by requiring that both elements in a party
structure be intervals:  thus a party structure is characterized by a pivotal type
hL h R h
** * ,[ , ) [ , ) .  with   and  = =• 0  We call the two parties Left   and Right  () () LR .
Associated with a party is a utility function, which is the average of its members
utility functions.
Thus
vt v t h dh
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0           (2.2)
(We drop a multiplicative constant.)  The utility functions n(, ) ◊ h are assumed to be
cardinally measurable and unit comparable (CUC), so that averaging them makes sense.
All parties contain three factions of decision makers: opportunists, reformists, and
militants.  (These factions are not to be identified with particular citizen types.  They are,
if you will, of measure zero in the population.)  Each faction possesses a real-valued


































with an analogous definition for Right’s three factions.  The three factions are interested,
respectively, in winning (opportunists), party-member welfare (reformists), and publicity
(militants).
Definition 1.  A party unanimity Nash equilibrium with endogenous parties (PUNEEP) is
a party structure (,) LRgiven by Lh = [, )
* 0  and Rh =• > [
*,)  with h
* 0, and a pair of
policies tt T
LR , Œ  such that
(A) there is no policy tT Œ such that
LJ R LJL R tt t t J ORM PP (, ) , , , , ≥ () =  for 
with at least one of these inequalities strict;
(B) there is no policy tT Œ  such that
RJL RJL R tt tt J O R M PP (, ) (,) , ,, ≥=  for 
with at least one of these inequalities strict;
(C)      
hL v t h v th






(, ) (, )
.
The three payoff functions of a parties’ factions each represent a complete order
on TT ¥ .  Their intersection represents a quasi-order on TT ¥ .  A PUNEEP is a Nash
equilibrium of the game played by these two quasi-orders, with the additional
requirement (C).  Requirement (C) was initially proposed by Baron (1993), in another
context, as modeling the stability of a party structure.
Remark 1.  It is easily shown that the reformists are gratuitous in definition 1.  That is, if
we eliminate the reformist factions, we do not alter the set of equilibria.  But notice, once
this is done, we never need mention expected utility, since only the reformists calculate10
that.  It thus suffices that {( ,) } vh h H ◊Œ  be a profile of CUC utility functions (i.e., they
need not represent preferences over lotteries).
Remark 2.  It is now convenient to alter the convention on how  voters who are
indifferent between the policies they face, vote, in the presence of parties.  When parties
are present, we will say that a voter who is indifferent between policies votes for the
policy of his party.  (Recall that each citizen is a member of one party: this is part of the
description of a political environment.)   Thus, formally, we now revise the definition of
p to:
pp (,) ((( ) ) (( , )))
* tt t t L I tt
LR L R LR =+ « FF W .                   (2.1’)
Remark 3.  In Roemer (2001, Chapter 8), it is shown that if sufficient convexity is
present, then every PUNEEP can be viewed as the outcome of generalized Nash
bargaining between the militant and opportunist factions of each party, given the other
party’s proposal.  There is, in general, a two dimensional manifold of PUNEEP.  Each
one is characterized by specifying the relative bargaining strengths of the two active
factions in each party - thus, two positive numbers.  Thus, parties compete with each
other à la Nash equilibrium, while internal factions bargain with each other à la Nash
bargaining.  The PUNEEP concept thus owes its origins doubly to John Nash.
We now further specialize to the case that F has a continuous, strictly increasing
distribution function, F,.  on R+
Remark 4.   There is another story (besides the three-faction story) that leads to the same
equilibrium concept.  Suppose there are two factions of decision  makers in a party -- the
opportunists, and those whom we may call the guardians.   The opportunists (as above)
wish to maximize the probability of their party’s winning.  The guardians insist that the11
policy chosen guarantee at least some given level of utility to their constituents: the
guardians in party L, for instance, require that the inequality vt k L
L
L () ≥  be satisfied, for
some number kL.  Subject to this constraint, and facing the opposition’s policy, the
opportunists choose a policy to maximize the probability of victory.
The reader can easily observe that the guardians are behaving just like the
militants, in the original formulation, and it therefore follows from Remark 1 that
PUNEEPs are exactly equilibria of this model, as well.
The opportunist-guardian story is really one of bounded rationality.  There are no
longer any reformists or any militants.  Reformism, after all, requires sophisticated
preferences, ones which can rank not only policies, but lotteries over policies.    Hence,
the story of this Remark may be a more appealing way to ‘rationalize’ the PUNEEP
concept.  The multiplicity of PUNEEPs is now seen to be associated with various values
of the ordered pair (,) kk LR .  The two-dimensionality of the equilibrium manifold is again
apparent.
We next define an auxiliary notion that is useful in the analysis.
Definition 2. A quasi-PUNE is an ordered pair (* ,) hy H Œ¥ R and a pair of policies
tt T
LR , Œ , such that vt h y vt h
LR (, ) (, * )
* ==  and:
2A. t
L solves
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* 0 nn (L0)12











hh v t hv t h
L Œ• ﬁ ≥ [,) ( , ) (, )
* (R0)
vth y (, )
* ≥ (R1)
2C. Constraints (L1) and (R1) bind at tt
LR  and   respectively.
We have:
Proposition 1.  Let v be continuous in h.  If (,, )
* tth
LR is a PUNEEP, then (,,,)
* tthy
LR  is
a quasi-PUNE, with  yv t h
L = (, )
* .
Proof: See appendix.
The converse of Proposition 1 is not true: there may be quasi-PUNEs that are not
PUNEEPs.  For if (,,,)
* tthy
LR  is a quasi-PUNE, it is possible that there exists a policy t
which improves the payoff of both Left’s militants and opportunists, by assembling a set
of voters who favor t over t
Rthat is disconnected and does not contain h
*.
We can give an alternative, conceptual definition of quasi-PUNE, which may be
helpful.  Consider the definition of PUNEEP (definition 1); let (* , , ) htt
LR be a candidate
PUNEEP.   Consider the opportunists in Left who are ‘testing’ the policy t
L: they are
searching for a policy that gives them a greater probability of victory than p(,) tt
LR  and
delivers at least the same average utility to L’s  members as does t
L.   If they find such a
policy, then  (* , , ) htt
LR is not a PUNEEP.  Indeed, there may be such a policy, call it t*,13
and the set of types that favor t* over t
R might not include L.   This would still show that
(* , , ) htt
LR is not a PUNEEP.  Now suppose that we restrict the opportunists of L to
looking for policies t that increase their probability of victory when played against t
R, and
do not lower the average utility of L,  and such that the coalition that favors t over t
R
includes L.   (We similarly require the analogous additional condition of Right’s
opportunists. )  If (* , , ) htt
LR survives this stronger deviation test, then it is (precisely) a
quasi-PUNE.  Because the test for quasi-PUNE is stricter than the test for PUNEEP, the
set of quasi-PUNEs includes the set of PUNEEPs.
We can now give a preview of our strategy.  In our politico-economic
environment, we can fully characterize the set of quasi-PUNEs:  the important and useful
fact is that we can compute quasi-PUNEs without recourse to fixed point theorems, using
only  optimization methods.  We will further note that the set of PUNEEPs is a
non-empty subset of the set of quasi-PUNEs.  We then conduct our dynamic analysis
assuming that each generation’s political equilibrium is some quasi-PUNE.  Whatever we
conclude will hold a fortiori for societies whose political equilibria are genuine ones, that
is, PUNEEPs.  In this manner we avoid ever having to solve the intractable problem of
characterizing precisely the set of PUNEEPs.
§3 Equilibrium at one date
Throughout this section, we analyze the society at one date.
A.  The politico-economic environment
(i)  Preferences14
A typical society, in our problem, consists of a continuum of adult types, each
characterized by her human capital h, where h is distributed according to a probability
measure F, whose mean is denoted m, and whose support is the positive real line.  We
denote the distribution function (CDF) of F by F.  Each adult has one child.  Adults care
about their household’s consumption, and their child’s (future) human capital.
We assume:
uxh x h (, ) log log , ¢ =+ ¢ g (3.1)
where  x is the household’s consumption, or after-tax income, and  ¢ h  is the child’s
(future) human capital.    Zero consumption is minimal household consumption.  Note
there is no preference for leisure
5.
(ii)  Technology
If r is invested in the education of a child whose parent is of type h then the
child’s future human capital will be
¢= hh r
bc a (3.2)
where a,, bc are positive constants
6.
b is the elasticity of child’s human capital w.r.t. parental human capital and c is
the elasticity of child’s human capital w.r.t. educational investment. Think of the
influence of the parent’s human capital on the child’s human capital as operating through
                                                   
5 As I noted in the introduction,  we may think of adults as caring about their own human capital
as well as their income.  But since their human capital is fixed by the time they make decisions,
we need not include the utility it generates in the utility function.   A utility function of this type
is used elsewhere -- see, for example, Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Zalor and Zeira (1993).
6 A production function of this type is employed in Becker and Tomes (1986), who  use the term
‘familial cultural infrastructure,’ which I shorten to ‘family culture.’15
family culture, or perhaps neighborhood effects (if neighborhoods are income-
segregated).     Bénabou (in press) uses a relationship like (3.2), and gives some weak
evidence that b+c<1;  we will, however, study the case b+c=1, for reasons explained
below, and even the case b+c>1.   We refer to these cases as ones of decreasing ,
constant, and increasing returns to scale, respectively.
If an adult of type h works at her full potential then her (pre-tax) earnings are h.
Thus human capital is measured in units of income-earning capacity.
(iii)  The policy space
Let C be the space of continuous functions on the domain R+.  A policy is a pair
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¢ + ¢ £
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hr h d h
hh r h
hr h
F                (3.3a)
for all                  (3.3b)
                 (3.3c)
,
where ‘prime’ indicates derivative, and the inequalities are meant to hold where the
derivatives exist.  The interpretation is that y() h  is the after-tax income of an adult of
typeh, and rh () is the public educational investment in a child from an h-family.  We
call y() () () hr hX h +∫ the total resource bundle allocated to an h household, so (3.3b,c)
restrict the rates at which the total resource bundle changes with h.   We may think of
(3.3b,c) social norms, as they are not motivated by political competition or incentive
compatibility considerations
7.
                                                   
7 There is a natural incentive compatibility condition, that adult utility be non-decreasing
in h, so that no adult would have an incentive to work at a lower income-earning capacity
than her true capacity.  The local version of this condition is:16
Thus, our policy space is  Tr C C =Œ ¥ {} (, ) y  (3.3a,b,c) hold .\
Our results will be sensitive to (3.3c), at least.  We must put upper and lower
bounds on the derivatives of the total resource function X; without out, there will be no
equilibria in our model with continuous policies.   We justify placing the upper bound of
one  (in (3.3c)) on  ¢ X  with the observation that,  in a laissez-faire regime, with no
taxation, we have  Xh h X h () , () = ¢ =  and so  1.  Thus the laissez-faire policy is on a
boundary of our policy space, and assumption (3.3c)  says that distributional policy
should not be more regressive than laissez-faire.    (Compare with the ubiquitous
Hotelling-Downs model, with affine income tax policies, in which the marginal tax rate is
restricted to be in the interval [0,1].  This is the analogue of our constraints (3.3b and c). )
We assume that all educational investment is public
8.  A policy (, ) y r specifies
decisions on the four political problems described in Section 1.
Thus the indirect utility function vT H : ¥Æ R is given by



















Some might prefer to substitute (3.5) for (3.3b) in the model, but doing so renders the
analysis below much more difficult: it converts what will be a convex optimization
problem on an infinite-dimensional space to a difficult, non-convex problem.  In the
interests of simplicity, and not diffusing attention from our main concern, we use (3.3b)
in lieu of (3.5).  We conjecture, however, that the results we report would remain the
same if (3.3b) were replaced with (3.5).
8 This assumption is relaxed below in section 5.17
vr h h h r h
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where, in the last line of (3.4), we have dropped a gratuitous constant term.
B.  Quasi-PUNEs
For a given point (, )
* hyŒ¥ + RR , consider the following two programs:
max log( ( ) log ( )) ( )
() () (. )
(( ) ( ) ) () (. )
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* hy  be such that solutions (, ) y
LL r  and (, ) y
RR r  exist to (3.6) and (3.7),
respectively, and such that inequalities (3.63) and (3.73) bind at the solutions.  We will
show that the following hold:
10
2
.( , , ) ( , , ) ,
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It will follow that (, ) (, ) yy
LL RR rr  and   constitute a quasi-PUNE at (, )
* hy , and
that solutions of programs (3.6) and (3.7) at which (3.63) and (3.73) bind comprise
precisely the quasi-PUNEs for our problem.
Our first task is to characterize the set
G= Œ ¥ + {( , ) |
* hy RR  solutions to (3.6) and (3.7) exist at which (3.63) and (3.73) bind}.
Note that Tr C C =Œ ¥ {} (, ) y  (3.61) and (3.62) hold .  For fixed h*, consider the
following three programs:
max ( , ; ) ( )
(, )
*













max ( , ; ) ( )
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Let their solutions be denoted tt t
LR ,,  and 
*, respectively, where ty = (, ) r  is the generic
policy.  Let  yh
** ()  be the value of program (3.10), i.e.
yh v h
** ** () (,) =t ,
and define
yh v h yh v h
LL RR () (,) , () (,) .
** ** == tt
We have:
Proposition 2.  For h
*given, (, )
* hyŒG iff
max[ ( ), ( )] ( ),
** * * yhyh y yh
LR ££           (3.11)\
or  G= £ £ {} (, ) max[ ( ), ( )] ( )
** * * * hy yh y h y yh
LR .19
Proof:  See appendix.
The virtue of the quasi-PUNE notion is now evident: we can characterize the set
G, and thus the set of quasi-PUNEs, by solving the three optimization programs (3.8),
(3.9), and (3.10).  No fixed-point machinery is needed to do this.
We next solve these three programs.













Lemma. Let X be the total resource dedicated to household h.  Then the



















Proof:  The household would choose consumption y to maximize its utility, which leads
immediately to the claim.    
Proof of Proposition 3: See appendix.20
Remark 5. If we replaced social norm (3.3b) with incentive compatibility (3.5),
Proposition 3, although probably true, is much more difficult to prove.  It is for this
reason that we employ (3.3b).
   Recall that  Xh h rh () () () . =+ y  By substituting from (3.12), we can reduce
(3.8), (3.9), and (3.10) to the following three programs:
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In other words, Proposition 3 enables us replace optimization problems on CC ¥  with
optimization problems on C.
We have:21
Proposition 4.  




* () ; ∫m
















where (x,y) solves the following two simultaneous equations:



















m              (3.13a)
  .                                 (3.13b)
  We have x >0.  The solution is illustrated in Figure 1.





















*is the solution of the equation





() ( ( )) . ++ - = Ú FF m (3.14)
The solution is illustrated in Figure 1.22
Proof:  See appendix.
Here is an intuitive argument for part of Proposition 4.
Consider program (3.8a).  The benefit to household h is log ( ) Xh; the cost  (to the






non-increasing in h, because  ¢ ≥ Xh () 0  is required.   So the optimizer should give as
much of the resource as possible to low h: front-loading, so to speak.  The binding
constraint is  ¢ ≥ Xh () 0 : so the planner allocates  Xh () . ∫m
Second, consider (3.10a).  Clearly it is a waste to give any resource to hh > *, so
we must have
Xh Xh h h () (* ) * . =>  for 
Now the optimizer wants to minimize what goes to [0,h*), conditional upon reaching a
high value at h*, so X should descend rapidly (at rate 1) to the left of h*.   The stated
function  Xh* makes the value at h* as large as possible.
Claim (3.9a) is harder to motivate, and so we do not do so.
In like manner using Proposition 3, we can reduce programs (3.6) and (3.7) to:
max log ( ) ( )
()
() ()





































max log ( ) ( )
()
() ()
log ( ) √,( . )
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Of course, the analogous result to Proposition 2 holds, that is:
Proposition 2a.  Let  √ {( , √)
* G= Œ ¥ + hy RR (3.6a) and (3.7a) have solutions at which
(3.63a) and (3.73a) bind}.  Define
√ ()l o g ()
√ ()l o g ()





















max[√ () , √ () ]√√ ()
** * * yhyh y yh
LR ££ . (3.11a)
Conversely, if (3.11a) holds, then (, √) √ * hyŒG.
Proof:  As in Proposition 2.
√ G is our parameterization of the set of quasi-PUNEs associated with the ‘reduced’
problem, where we work with the total-resource bundle function, X.  From consideration24
of the three programs (3.8), (3.9), and (3.10), it is clear that the interval of admissible
values  √ y is non-empty for every h*.
In figure 2, we illustrate the manifold  √ G.  Although the picture is not accurate, it
is the case that quasi-PUNEs exist for every h*>0.
We next derive what the quasi-PUNE looks like at (, √) √ * hyŒG.
Proposition 5.  Let (, √) √.
* hyŒG   Then:
a. The solution to (3.6a) is illustrated in Figure 3.  It is defined by:
Xh
Xh h


























where ( √ ,) Xh
L
L 0  is the simultaneous solution of the two equations:
log( √ () ) √,
* Xh h y
L
L 0 +- =          (3.15a)
√ () ( ) ( ( ))( * ) .
*






0 1 +- + - - = Ú F m (3.15b)
We have  √ X
L
0 0 > .






















where ( √ ,) Xh
R
R 0 is the simultaneous solution of:








0 0 1 ++ - = Ú F m (3.15d)
We have  √ X
R
0 0 > .
Proof: See appendix.
Propositions 4 and 5 completely characterize the manifold of quasi-PUNEs.
   We have one item left to check: that every member of each party weakly prefers
her party’s policy to the other party’s policy.  This claim is easy to verify.  Indeed, from
figure 3  we see that the total resource bundle functions of the two parties coincide on the
interval [,]
* hh L  of types, and indeed, each member of a party weakly favors her party’s
policy to the other’s.
The two educational investment functions are just multiples of the functions























From Figure 3, we see that, any quasi-PUNE, the Left policy is more egalitarian
than the Right policy.  Furthermore, each is more egalitarian than the laissez-faire policy,
a fact we state as:
Proposition 6.  Let b+c=1.  Let hh
21 <  be two levels of human capital, and let h
iJ be the
human capital level of the child of h
i, for i=1,2 in regime J, where J can be L,R, or lf,
standing for Left victory, Right victory, or laissez-faire.  (The L and R policies are
























Proposition 6 tells us that, under either Left or Right victory in a democracy, there
is an equalizing effect on the dispersion of human capital from one generation to the next,
when there are constant returns to scale.  If b+c < 1, the equalizing effects of Left and
Right policies are only magnified.
C. Existence of PUNEEP
We know every PUNEEP is a quasi-PUNE.  We now show that the set of
PUNEEPs is non-empty.  To do so, we compute the PUNEEP where each party plays the
ideal policy of its militants.
Let h
* be any type, and let Lh R h == • [, ) [ , ) .
** 0  and     Let each party play the




**  and  .   This is clearly
a PUNE because the militant factions will not deviate to any other policy.  It will,27
however, generally not satisfy the endogenous party constraint [Definition 1, part (C)].  It




** (* ) (* ) (* ) * , == = + m   where
x(h*) is the number x that solves equation (3.13b).  Thus, there is a PUNEEP where  both
parties play the ideal policies of their militant factions at h* when the triple (x,y,h*)
solves equations (3.13a), (3.13b), and
xh += *, m
simultaneously.
It would be distracting to show that such a solution exists for any F.  Without
proving this, we simply display the solution for F taken as the lognormal distribution
with mean 40 and median 30: it is
hx h y h *., ( * ) . , ( * ) . . === 39 3739 626149 171 38
Unfortunately, this is the only PUNEEP whose existence is easy to prove, because
it is trivial to observe that neither parties’ militants will accept any deviation.
Hence the set of PUNEEP is non-empty.   I conjecture that the set of PUNEEPs is




We now imagine a sequence of overlapping generations, at dates t = 01 ,, ....  The
probability distribution of adult wages at date 0 is F
0.  Political competition is organized
over the questions of taxation and educational investment, and a PUNEEP is realized,
inducing a policy lottery.  One party wins the election, and its educational investment
policy is implemented, giving rise to a distribution of wages at date 1
1 ,F .  This process
continues forever, inducing a sequence {} F
t of wage distributions.  We are interested in
properties of the asymptotic distribution of human capital.
Over time, it is not reasonable to suppose that a remains constant.  We therefore
denote its time-dated value by  a
t.  Indeed, a includes the effect of capital stock on
wages, which is  not modeled explicitly.  As we are assuming that  policy has no effect on
labor supply, we similarly assume that it has no effect on capital investment; thus, we
may take the sequence {} a
t to be exogenously given.
 Let m

















We are, in particular, interested in the limit of {} h
t .  Does it exist, and if so, is it positive
or zero?  If it is zero, we say that the distribution of human capital converges to equality.
(In that case, given any pair of dynasties, the ratio of levels of human capital of their
representatives tends to one with time.)
B. Laissez-faire29
Under laissez-faire,  Xh h () . =  The optimizing parent divides her income between




























Suppose that bc += 1.  Then it follows that the distribution of human capital tomorrow is
identical to the distribution today: all human capitals are multiplied by a constant.
Consequently, the coefficient of variation of human capital is constant across time.
If bc +< 1, then it follows immediately from the above formula that the ratio of
human capitals in any two dynasties approaches one over time, and hence the coefficient
of variation of human capital approaches zero.
If b+c >1, then the ratio of human capitals in any two dynasties approaches
infinity, and the coefficient of variation explodes.
C. Democracy
We will first work with an altered sequence of distributions, normalized to
maintain the mean constantly at m
0.  Define the distribution function







and let  √ F
t be the associated probability measure.  Then the mean of  √ F
t is m
0.  Since  √ F
t
has the same coefficient of variation as F
t, it will suffice to study the coefficients of
variation of the sequence {√ } F
t .30
Proposition  7. Let  bc +£ 1. Then
  (a) then the distribution function  √ F
t+1cuts the distribution function  √ F
t once from below.
That is,
() ( √ () √ () √ () √ ( )). $ ¢ << ¢ ﬁ< > ¢ ﬁ>
++ hh h F h F hh hF h F h
tt tt 0
11  and 
(b) The sequence  {} h
t  is monotone decreasing, and hence converges.
Proof. See appendix.
We have noted that if b+c < 1, then, under laissez-faire, the distribution of human
capital converges to equality.  It is easy to show that the same thing happens under
democracy, regardless which quasi-PUNE is realized at each date: this follows from the
argument in Proposition 6, which shows that the coefficient of variation under democracy
decreases at least as fast as under laissez-faire.     Thus to compare the performance of
democracy and laissez-faire, with regard to equality, for the case b+c < 1,  would require
comparing speeds of convergence, a delicate undertaking.   Rather than attempting this,
we will study, instead, the asymptotic properties of the democratic regime under the
assumption that b+c=1, for we know that under laissez-faire, there is no change in the
CV over time in this case.  Thus, laissez-faire provides a clean bench-mark in the case of
constant returns.
We will study the asymptotic distribution of human capital for certain special
sequences of quasi-PUNEs.  Fix a type h*>0, and define the sequence A(h*) as those
quasi-PUNEs which lie on the lower boundary of the manifold  √ G
t at each date t, and the
pivotal type ht
*which demarcates the partition of the type space into the two parties is the
t
th descendent of h*.  Let B(h*)  be that sequence of quasi-PUNEs which, at each date t,31
lie on upper boundary of the manifold  √ G
t, and where ht
*  is the t
th descendent of h*. See
figure 2.
Theorem 1.   Let  b+c=1.  For any h*>0, the limit CV of the  distribution of human
capital for the sequence A(h*) is zero, and the limit  CV of  distribution of human capital
for the sequence B(h*) is positive.
The sequence B(h*) is associated with quasi-PUNEs at which both parties play the ideal
policy of type ht
* : these are quasi-PUNEs where the opportunists in the two parties are
all-powerful.  To see this, note that the upper envelope of the manifold of quasi-PUNEs,
illustrated in Figure 2, is associated with pairs (* , √) hy  at which the right-hand inequality
of (3.11a) is binding.  This means that both parties are playing the ideal policy of type h*:
the parties are as far as possible from satisfying their militants.   In the sequence A(h*), in
contrast, the militants in the two parties are powerful: in at least one party, at those quasi-
PUNEs, the party plays the ideal policy of its militants, and in the other party, the
militants are as strong as they can be.  These quasi-PUNEs are associated with points
(* , √) hy  at which the left-hand inequality in (3.11a) is binding.
Note that, if F
t is the CDF of the distribution of types at date t, for either the
sequence A(h*) or B(h*), then Fh
t
t ()
*  is constant for all t, because the members of a
dynasty occupy the same rank in their respective type-distributions forever.  Since the
probability of Left victory at a quasi-PUNE in either of these sequences is p
** (() ) Fh
t
t ,
this probability is a positive constant over time, in the open interval (0,1).  Therefore, in32
both sequences of quasi-PUNEs, each of Left and Right win elections an infinite number
of times.  We use this fact below.
Proof of Theorem: See appendix.
§5  Topping Off
We have assumed until now that educational funding is purely public.  But
winning publicly financed education has been itself a significant victory of democracy.
So it would have been more convincing to begin with the supposition that education
could be privately or publicly financed.
First, note that at any quasi-PUNE, under our assumptions, no household will
desire to top off public education with additional private education, because every quasi-
PUNE partitions the household’s total resource bundle just as the optimizing household
would.  So there will be no demand for further private education at these equilibria.
Now suppose that it is not assumed, initially, that education will be publicly








  Thus, the h-household facing the policy (( ) , () ) y hr h
solves for its private educational investment, which we denote r
P (h):
Max h r c r h r
r
PP






























































Now each party takes account of the fact that its members will top off, if need be, and so
we may write the program of the Left party (for instance) at h* as:
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It is thus clear that the set of  quasi-PUNEs where private financing of education is not
precluded is isomorphic to the set of quasi-PUNEs where only public financing is
possible.  It is a matter of indifference whether education is publicly funded or whether
households finance some or all education privately: the children receive identical
educational investments in both cases.
In other words, our model is not constructed to elucidate why publicly financed
education is an almost ubiquitous institution of advanced democracies.
§6   Democratic dynamics with a unidimensional policy space
In this section we study the dynamics of the distribution of human capital under
‘median voter politics,’ in order to compare what occurs to the results of section 4.34
To this end, suppose that the political problem is to choose a total-resource-
bundle function  Xh () , where X  is an affine function satisfying constraints:
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Using the budget constraint we may write:
Xh a h a () ( ), =+ - 1 m
and thus the policy space is the unidimensional interval a Œ[,] 01.  The indirect utility
function of voter h on the policy space is
vah Log ah a (;) ( ( )) , =+ - 1 m
which is single-peaked (in a).  Consequently, there is a unique Condorcet winner, the
ideal policy of the voter with median human capital.  It follows that the political
equilibrium under Hotelling-Downs politics
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m
m
where  m is the median of F.
                                                   
9 In Downsian politics, the two parties consist solely of opportunists.  Each party, that is, desires
to maximize the probability of victory.35
Suppose b+c = 1.  If m >m, then the political equilibrium is laissez-faire, and it
follows that the coefficient of variation is constant forever, since the distribution simply
reproduces itself forever (modulo a constant multiplicative factor).
On the other hand, if m










0 is the investment function at the Condorcet winner at date 0.  It follows
that the human capital of the child of h will be:
Sh kh

















0 = Ú kh d Fh
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since the median of the new distribution is the child of the median of the earlier
distribution.
If m






() =  is the human capital of the grandchild of h.
It therefore follows that the coefficient of variation of human capital converges to
zero if and only if m
tt <m for all t.  For if it ever happens that m
tt >m, then the CV is
constant from that time onwards.   If  m
tt <m is always true, it is obvious from the
formula for Sh t()  that the ratio of human capitals of any two dynasties approaches unity.
We now have:36
Theorem 2.  Let b+c=1.  Let F be the date 0 distribution of h,  with median m and mean
m.  Under median-voter politics, on the unidimensional policy space, the CV of the
distribution of human capital converges to zero if and only if
log log ( ). mh d F h £Ú
Proof: See appendix.
The condition "log log ( )" mh d F h £Ú is stronger than the condition "" m £m.  (Just
note that log log ( ) exp( log ( )) ( ) , mh d F h m h d Fh m h dF h £ﬁ £ ﬁ £ = ÚÚ Ú m  where the
last implication follows from Jensen’s inequality [for convex functions].)  But the
converse direction is generally false.  So the critical inequality for the theorem is one that
can be interpreted as strong positive skewness of the distribution F (because ‘m<m’  is
commonly called positive skewness).
It is easy to see that if b+c<1, then the CV converges to zero always.  Moreover,
if b+c>1 and b<1, then the argument of Theorem 2 shows that the CV converges to zero
if and only if strong positive skewness holds; when it does not hold, the CV explodes.
§7 Simulations
We here report the results of several simulations.  In the first economy simulated,
b=c=0.5=g,  and we begin with the lognormal distribution whose mean and median are
40 and 30, respectively -- this looks like the distribution of income in the US, in
thousands of dollars, in the early 1990s.  We take as the quasi-PUNE realized the one
with pivot h* at the median of the distribution at each date (which means each party
represents exactly one-half the population) and which is located half-way between the37
upper and lower boundaries in the manifold of quasi-PUNEs – thus, we attempt to
capture a political system where the opportunists and militants each have some
bargaining power inside the parties.
  Some results are presenting in Table 1 and Figure 5.  At each date, each party
wins with probability one-half; there is a different sequence of L-R victories in the nine
simulations displayed in the table, depending on the realization of this random variable.
We see that the CV of the distribution of human capital appears to converge very rapidly
to zero in the six generations of our simulations.  Theorem 1, however, does not tell us
whether, in fact, convergence to zero occurs, because the PUNEs we study are not on the
lower boundary of the manifold.
Thus, we see that the convergence to equality – or at least to very low levels of
inequality -- which occurs at certain quasi-PUNEs, even when b+c =1, is very dramatic
in the model.   Ruthlessly competitive politics are radically different from laissez-faire.
As a second illustration of the equalizing power of political competition,  I ran
simulations for the economy with b=c= 0.75 -- that is, with increasing returns to scale.  (I
began with same lognormal distribution of human capital.)  The results for two six-
generation societies are presented in Table 2.  We see that the CV decreases over time,
although not so dramatically.  But after six generations of laissez-faire, the CV of the
distribution of human capital is 1.03 x 10
11 !  In the light of the evident effect of
increasing returns, political competition, as here formulated, is strongly equalizing.
§ 8 Discussion
We summarize the dynamics of human capital in Table 3.38
[table 3 here]
The case b+c=1  offers the cleanest way of comparing the performance of the
three regimes.  In our hypothetical laissez-faire society, the coefficient of variation(CV)
of the distribution of human capital stays constant over time, when the educational
production function exhibits constant returns to scale.  Under democracy, the CV of that
distribution decreases monotonically; whether or not it decreases to zero depends, in our
model, on the nature of intra-party struggle.  If militants (or guardians) are relatively
powerful, then the limit distribution is one of perfect equality.  If the opportunists are
relatively powerful, it is not.  One might paraphrase by saying that, to the extent that
democratic politics are ideological  then democracy engenders equality, but if democratic
politics become dominated by political opportunists then equality is not achieved in the
limit.   If there are decreasing returns to scale (b+c <1), then democracy and laissez-faire
both produce equality in the long-run, and we suggest (without proof) that our results
translate into statements about relative speeds of convergence to equality.
Our conclusion is very different from what Hotelling-Downs politics produces, on
a unidimensional policy space.     When b+c=1, convergence to equality occurs, when
political competition occurs with respect to the natural unidimensional policy space, if
and only if the initial distribution of human capital is ‘strongly positively skewed.’    This
result differs in two ways from the result under democracy.  First, the conclusion of
Theorem 1 is independent of the initial distribution, and second, on the large policy
space, convergence to equality never occurs when the opportunists are the dominant
factions in the parties.  (This is, after all, the analogue to Hotelling-Downs politics, where
each party desires only to maximize its vote fraction.)   We propose that this difference39
between the models shows the pitfalls of the unidimensional Hotelling-Downs analysis,
and underscores our point that large-dimensional policy spaces are not simply a
mathematical nicety: rather, a serious misspecification occurs if we model politics in a
unidimensional way, when, in reality, policies are not so restricted.
We offer an intuition to explain the different results that we attain on the uni- and
infinite-dimensional policy spaces.  When the opportunists dominate party politics,
equilibrium entails that both parties propose the ideal policy of the median (in the
unidimensional case) or the pivot (in the infinite dimensional case) voter.   In the
unidimensional case, if the median is less than the mean human capital, then the median
voter’s ideal policy is in fact progressive -- that is, very good for the poor.  (It entails
equal investment in all children.)  This is a consequence of the fact that there are very few
degrees of policy freedom, so that doing well by the median voter requires, willy-nilly,
doing well by the poor.  But in the infinite dimensional case, doing well by the pivot
voter requires a regressive policy for the poor!  That is to say, on the infinite dimensional
policy space, the interests of the poor and the pivot diverge, something which is not true
on the unidimensional policy space.
However, when the militants dominate party politics, then the policy is
progressive for the poor in the Left party, and this delivers ultimate convergence to
equality.
It is also noteworthy that, although our policy space is infinite dimensional, the
policies proposed by each party in political equilibrium in fact lie in two two-dimensional
spaces of functions.  First, note that once the total-resource function  X() ◊  is specified,
then we know the two functions y and r; second, note that once we know the two40
coordinates (* , (*)) hX h , then we can immediately compute both the Right and the Left
total-resource function, given the budget constraint.  So each party, in the end,  chooses
its policy in a two dimensional subspace of T, parameterized by the pivot type and the
total resource she receives.    In real democracies, we almost always observe piece-wise
linear tax policies, often with more pieces than the policies parties propose in our
model
10.  We can generate more pieces on the tax policies (in our model) by including
more factions in the parties than the ones here postulated.
In other words, the relative simplicity of observed income tax schedules is
consistent with our model’s assumption, that parties are choosing policies from an
infinite dimensional policy space.
Why have we not observed more rapid convergence to equality of wages in
advanced democracies?   Besides the fact (if it is one) that politics are dominated by
opportunists, a number of reasons can be suggested -- reasons which take the form of
divergence from the premises of our model.  These include:
∑  random talent or effort
∑  technological shocks
∑  imperfectly representative democracy
∑  elastic labor supply
∑  non-economic issues
∑  multi-party politics.
                                                   
10 Every OECD country except Germany has a piece-wise linear income tax schedule.  Germany
uses a smooth polynomial.41
We take these up in turn.
In the model, the human capital of the child is a deterministic function of the
human capital of the parent and educational investment.  In reality, children from families
with similar parents differ according to their talent and their effort, which we could
model by inserting a stochastic multiplicative term in the educational production
function.  Doing this does not complicate the analysis very much.  Statements about
convergence to equality in the deterministic model become translated into analogous
statements about the non-persistence of the effect of initial conditions on the wages of
distant descendents.  That is, in the model with stochastic talent, in the sequence of
PUNEs that lie on the lower boundary of the manifold, it is the case that there is
eventually no influence of the wage of the initial parent (Eve) on the wages of members
of her dynasty, whereas, for the sequence of PUNEs on the upper boundary of the
manifold, there is persistence.  Thus, ‘convergence to equality’ becomes translated into
‘equality of opportunity,’ in the sense that the socio-economic status of an individual’s
family origin eventually has no influence on his own level of human capital.
In our model, the only kind of technological change allowed was neutral, in the
sense of  time-dating the constant a
t.  In reality, technological change is often non-
neutral.  This is the case with the shock to the educational production function in the US
and UK in the last twenty years.  Clearly, if non-neutral technological change is
historically important, it can upset the process of convergence to equality.
Our model assumes that every citizen is a member of a party, and that parties
aggregate the interests of their members in an unbiased way: these two premises
constitute the assumption of ‘perfectly representative democracy.’  There are very few42
countries today where an approximation of these premises holds, and , in every case, this
ideal has only existed for at most two generations.
Because we have assumed an inelastic labor supply, parties in the model put forth
policies which involve 100% marginal tax rates on certain intervals of the income
distribution. With elastic labor supply, this will not happen, and convergence to equality
will be retarded, if not eliminated.
Non-economic issues, especially concerning racial and ethnic questions, are
politically salient in many countries, and these issues can retard redistribution.  Thus,
poor natives (or whites) of a country may vote for the party of the Right because that
party opposes immigration (or income redistribution to minorities).   There is reason to
believe that American racism can explain a large part of the difference in the degrees of
redistribution between the US and Europe.  (See  Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote [2001],
and Lee and Roemer [2002].)   But, in our model, citizens are presumed to have only
economic interests.
Finally, our model assumes only two parties.  We offer no analysis of the case
when the number of parties is endogenous.
On the other hand, there are features of reality, not present in the model, that
render reality more prone to equalization than the model: principally, citizens do have
some degree of ‘altruism,’ which is to say, concern for the children of others.  Even
without altruism, because education is to some degree a public good --  parents want the
children of others to be educated because that will enhance the welfare of their
children—convergence to equality will be at least as rapid as in our model.43
Thus, our model should be viewed as asking the question: In an ideal type of
democracy, where citizens are interested only in their own dynasty, and education is a
private good, will competitive politics induce equalization of human capital?  Clearly this
is only the beginning of a thorough analysis.
In the United States, funding for public education of h-households does increase
with h:  this is accomplished through the linking of educational finance with the local
property tax base.  In the political equilibria of our model, this is the case—that is, both
parties propose policies r(h) that are everywhere non-decreasing in h, and increasing in h
in some intervals.  In many European countries, equal public educational investment in
children of all backgrounds is closer to the truth. Section 5 tells us that, in these
equilibria, rich parents will top off the public investment in their children.  I conjecture
that, at least in the Nordic countries, this topping-off does not occur.   We may
understand this as the consequence of the operation of another social norm – not one we
have modeled here.  There is, however, an alternative explanation, that the education of
other people’s children is a public good.
We conclude with two final comments about the nature of democracy as here
modeled.     First, our results on dynamics center on the opportunist-ideological
controversy in democratic politics.   We believe this conflict is an essential feature of
political representation, and hence defend the importance that it is given in the PUNE
model.  Secondly, the militants, reformists, and guardians are utilitarian, in the sense that
they employ an objective function which is the average welfare of the party’s
constituents. It is key for our results that the poor be represented in one of the parties.
Suppose that the poor were not represented in either party.  Then even the militants in44
Left would propose policies giving the poor as little as possible, consistent with giving
the pivot voter his required utility.  Both parties would propose regressive educational
policies for the poor, and convergence to equality would never occur.  It is probably the
case that the poor can be underrepresented in Left, without losing convergence to
equality, but they must be represented at least to some positive degree.  From a practical
political viewpoint, this may be the most demanding condition of our model.
Appendix:Proofs of propositions
Proof of Proposition 1:
Let (,, )
* tth
LR  be a PUNEEP with h*>0, Lh R h == • [,*), [ *, ). 0 and By Remark 2,
pp (,) (() )
* tt L
LR= F  and 01 << p
*(() ) F L  by definition of p
* and the fact that F is
strictly increasing on R+.  By Condition 1A of PUNEEP, there is no policy t that gives
Left’s militants a higher payoff than they receive at t
L and  gives a higher probability of
victory against t
R.  In particular, there is no policy t that gives Left’s militants a higher
payoff than at t
L and such that
hhv t h v t h
R Œﬁ≥ [, ) (,) ( ,)
* 0,
and
vth y (, )
* > ,
for if there were, than, by continuity of v in h there would be an interval [, )
** hh+e  such
that
hh h v t hv t h
R Œ+ ﬁ> [, ) ( , ) (, ) .
**e45
It would then follow that at least the set of voters Lh h »+ [, )
**e  would favor t
and so a higher probability of victory could be achieved for Left at no cost to her
militants.
It therefore follows that statement 2A of definition 2 is true, and that () L1 binds.
In like manner, statement 2B of definition 2 is true and () R1  binds, which
concludes the proof.   
Proof of Proposition 2:
1. Suppose  yy h >
** () .  Then there is no feasible solution to (3.6) or (3.7), for (3.63)
will never hold on T.  Thus we must have  yy h £
** ()  if (, )
* hyŒG.
2. Suppose  yy h
L < ()
* .  Then constraint (3.63) is not binding at the solution to (3.6),
since the solution to (3.8) is indeed the solution to (3.6).  Similarly, if  yyh
R < ()
* ,
then constraint (3.73) is not binding at the solution to (3.7).  Thus (, )
* hyŒG
implies  yy h y h
LR ≥ max[( ( ), ( )].
**
3. Conversely, if (3.11) holds, then the opportunity sets of (3.6) and (3.7) are non-
empty, and at the optimal solutions, (3.63) and (3.73) must bind, because
yy h y h
LR ≥ max[ ( ), ( )]
** .
4.       The proof thus far  ignores the compactness issue - whether non-emptiness of the
opportunity sets for programs (3.6) and (3.7) implies the attainment of (optimal)
solutions.  We shall show below that if (3.11) holds, solutions are indeed attained.

Proof of Proposition 3:46
Let ( √,√) y r  be a solution to program (3.6), and suppose that the claim were false.  Let























It is straightforward to check that (, ) . y rT Œ  Furthermore, each household receives the
same total resource at ( √,√) y r  and at (, ) y r .  But according to the lemma, for every h,
(( ) , () ) y hr h is the optimal way for household h to allocate the total resource assigned to
it between consumption and education.  Therefore the objective function of (3.6)
increases if we substitute  (, ) y r  for ( √,√) y r , a contradiction.   (To be precise, the argument
shows that  ( √,√) y r  must equal (, ) y r  except possibly on a set of F-measure zero.
Continuity then completes the argument.)     
Proof of Proposition 4
11:
We prove part (b).  Proofs of the other parts are somewhat simpler, and of the same
character.   Our task is to solve for the ideal policy of the Right militants:
                                                   
11 We construct a proof that is ‘elementary,’ in the sense of not requiring any knowledge of
optimal control theory or the calculus of variations.47


















The solution is shown in the figure 1,  where (,) xy is the simultaneous solution of the
following two equations:



















m              (A1)
  .                                 (A2)
(A1) says that the function X  integrates to m , as required; (A2) fixes a particular pair (x,y).
Denote this policy by  X *.
Define the function
D() ( * () () ) () () ( ( * () () ) ) ( ( * () () ) () ) .
*
ee l e d m e =+ + - + ¢ +- +
• •





I will produce a non-negative function l and a positive number d such that, for any
function g, D is maximized at e=0.   In particular, it follow that DD () () . 01 ≥ The second
and third terms on the r.h.s of the definition of D  vanish at e=0.   This will thus imply that
LogX h dF h Log X h g h dF h
hh





for any variation  g, proving the claim.48
Note that D is a concave function
12.  It therefore suffices to show that  ¢ = D () . 00
Define l and d as follows, where f is the density of F and (x,y) are defined above:
(i) l(0)=0,
(ii)  ¢ = ld () () , hf h  on [0,h*]




*, ], hf h
fh
hx
hy  on [






We must show that (i)-(iv) are consistent, given (v).  Note that  ¢ ≥ l 0 on [0,h*] from (ii)
and  ¢ £ l 0 on [h*,y] from (iii) and the definition of y.  From (i) , (ii) and (v):
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But the last equation is true by definition of (x,y).
                                                   
12 Here is where we exploit the fact that the optimization program is convex.49
Thus the function l is well-defined and non-negative on its domain, as required.
We now differentiate D,  where g is an arbitrary, differentiable function:
¢ =- ¢ -
••
ÚÚ Ú D ()
() ()
*( )
























hghd h hghd h hgh







() () () ()
()() ()() ()()




















hg h d h
xy
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= ¢ [by definition of   and  ld ], 0
as was to be shown.
We finally  prove that x>0.   Using integration by parts:
hdF h hF h F h dhy F h F h d h
y y yy
() () () () () . =- = - ÚÚ Ú
0 0 00
Hence, (3.13a) reduces to50
xF h d h y F h dh F h dh
y
y y
=+ -=+ - = -
•
Ú Ú Ú mm () ( () ) (( ) ) , 11
0 0
where the last step uses the well-known fact that m= -
•
Ú(( ) ) . 1
0
Fh d h  Since F’s support is








a contradiction.  Therefore x>0.                          
Proof of Proposition 5:
The proof that the optimal policies are as stated follows the template of the proof of
Proposition 4(b),  presented above.  We will not go through those analogous
constructions.  We do prove here that  √ X
R
0 0 > , and hence, that  √ X
L
0 0 > .   From (3.11a), we
have that
Exp y Exp y h X h x h
R
h
R (√)( √ ( *)) ( *) *, * ≥= = +




*()  on [0, h*], we have  XX x
RR () √ . 0 0 =≥   Now use the fact that x > 0 (Prop.4).

Proof of Proposition 6:
1.  We may view figure 3 as a graph of the two educational investment functions,
rr
LR () () ◊◊  and  .  Observe this geometric fact: Any chord on the graph of either function51
cuts the vertical axis above the origin, when extended.    (It is crucially important that the
graphs of these two functions cut the vertical axis above the origin.)
2.  Consider the R policy and let the equation of the chord connecting
(, () ) (, () ) hr h hr h







































































because b+c = 1.   The rest of the claim is straight-forward.    
Proof of Proposition 7:
Part (a).  Let (, ) y r  be the PUNEEP at date t.  Since the mapping hh r h
tb c Æa () is
strictly monotone increasing, parents and children occupy the same ranks in their
respective wage distributions, that is:
"=
+ hF h r h F h




















Let q:RR ++ Æ  be defined by:52
"Œ Æ +
+










Then we may rewrite (4.4) as  √ () √ (( ) ) FhF h
tt +- =











1() hh  as hh
>




































 is strictly increasing on R+, taking
on values from zero to “infinity,” which means that
() ( ) () )
** $ ¢ £<¢ ﬁ< > ¢ ﬁ> hh h h h h h 0 za za  and  .
 This will prove part (a).
Suppose Left won the election at date t.  The graph of rh () is a multiplicative
constant of the graph of  X
L pictured in Figure 3.  Obviously z() h  is strictly increasing on
the intervals [, ) , ) , 0 hh L  and [
* •  where r is constant.  On the interval [,]







































































Since b0 0 > , the r.h.s. of the last inequality is smaller than unity, and hence z() h  is
strictly increasing on [,]







.  But this means bc +£ 1, which is our premise.
Now suppose that Right won the election at date t.  Again consult figure 3.
Exactly, the same kind of argument shows that z is strictly increasing.
Part (b) .  Since the sequence  √ F
t {}  is mean-preserving and  √ F
t+1 cuts  √ F
tonce from below,
we have that  √ F
t+1 second-order stochastic dominates  √ . F
t   It therefore follows that the
sequence of CVs is monotone decreasing, and therefore converges
13.     
Proof of Theorem 1:
1.  We prove the second claim first.  Fix h* > 0; without loss of generality, normalize by
setting h*=1.  At date 0, both parties play the policy defined in Proposition 4, part (c).
We shall, at each date, renormalize so that the descendents of h* always have one unit of
human capital -- that is, we divide all human capitals
  by the level of human capital of the
contemporaneous member of the h* dynasty.  This does not affect coefficients of
variation.




















£  for  (4.9)
where  X0
* is defined by (3.14).  Eqn. (4.9) follows directly from Proposition 4(c), and our
normalization procedure.
                                                   
13 We can prove that the sequence of distribution functions  √ F
t converges weakly to a limit
distribution.  But all we need in what follows is the convergence of the sequence of CVs.54
2.  Denote the distribution of human capital at date t in the sequence B(h*) by F
t.  Then



















* is defined by
Xh d F h F t
tt t * () ( ( ) ) ++ - = Ú
0
1
11 m , (4.10)
where m
t is the mean of distribution F

















































       =  
using (4.9), where Sh 2()  is the (normalized) human capital of the grandchild of h.  By
induction, for the T

























































3.  Let 01
21 <<< hh   be two levels of human capital at date 0.  If the product








 converges, then from (4.11), it follows that Sh Sh cc





, and so the
CV of F
t does not converge to zero, because the ratio of human capitals of pairs of
dynasties does not converge to unity.55
4. (the key step)  Thus, to prove the claim, we need only show convergence of the infinite
product  D.   Integrating by parts, note that:






1 ÚÚ =- () ( ) () ,
and so from (4.10) we deduce:
XF h d h t





that is,  Xt
* is the area ‘above’ the CDF on the interval [1,•).  (Use the fact that
m
tt Fhd h =-
•
Ú(( ) ) 1
0
.)    By definition of F
1  we have:
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because Fh FS h
01
1 () ( () ) =   (i.e., members of a dynasty occupy the same rank in their





















=        (from Prop.4(c)),




b 1 1 ()
=
-   .  Therefore, continuing the above expansion:












By induction, it follows that:
Xb F h d h t






* Â converges, and, in particular,  Xt
* . Æ 0   But note that
log log( ),
* D= + Â 1 Xt
which converges iff  Xt
* Â  converges, because for  Xt
* near zero, log( )
** 1+@ XX tt .
Therefore D < •, as we set out to prove.
5.  We next consider the sequence A(h*).   The lower boundary of the manifold  √ G
t
consists of two segments.  On the first segment, the Left party plays the ideal policy of its
militants which is the constant functionXh
tt () =m.  On the second segment, the Right
party plays the ideal policy of its militants, given by Prop 4(b).  If the sequence A(h*)
spends an infinite number of periods on the first segment, then, since the Left wins an
infinite number of times in that subsequence, the CV converges to zero, because the ratio
of human capitals in any two dynasties approaches unity.  We therefore assume, w.l.o.g.,
that the quasi-PUNEs in the sequence A(h*) always lie on the second segment.
















where (,) xy tt  are defined by the time-dated versions of equations (3.13a, 3.13b), and the































L is defined by











++ + - = Ú () ( )( () )
*
** 1 m .57
6.  We next observe that, to show the CVs of {} F
t  converges to zero, it suffices to show
that the CVs would converge to zero if Left won every election in the sequence A(h*).




01 2 3 ,,,. . . (i)
Now replace the Right policies in this sequence with the laissez-faire policy, which is
Xh h




03 ,,,. . . (ii)




03 , ... (iii)
that is, of the sequence of Left policies.  But the limit CV of (i) is surely no larger than
the limit CV of (ii), because the right policy at every date reduces the CV (see Prop. 6).
So if the limit CV of (iii) is zero, so is the limit CV of (i), a fortiori.
7.  Therefore it suffices to show that the limit CV of a sequence of Left victories is zero.
8.  Consider the graph of the CDF of a distribution function at some date, illustrated in
Figure 4, with various areas labeled.  Integrating (3.13a) by parts shows that




Ú(( ) ) ; 1
that is, area D = x. The mean of the distribution, m, is the area above the CDF; that is:
m= + + + + + +






Therefore m- + = - + ()( ) .
* xh A CE
But (4.14) says m- + = - () ,
* xh BE  and so, reverting to the time-dated notation:
ABC
ttt =+ . (4.15)
9.  We next note that  AD
tt +Æ 0 with t; this employs the same argument as in step 4
above, because  Xt
L is always a constant function for hh t >
*.  Therefore,  A
t Æ 0, and so
from (4.15), lim lim . BC
tt == 0
10.  Denote rF h
t
t ∫ ()





L =- (( ) ) .  By step 9, since
B
t Æ 0, we have that either hF h r t
Lt
t
L ÆÆ 0 or ( ) .  We claim that ht
L does not approach
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1   Letting  yy t * lim = , we
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1,   for  159
Now both  XX t
L
t
R  and   must integrate to m
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                  (4.16)                   (4.16)
Since y*> 1, lim ( *) . Fy
t =1   (Recall , Left policies squeeze all h>1 eventually to 1.)  And
lim ( ) * .
**




1 ÚÚ £= -
Therefore, (4.16) says that
01 1 1 =- + - --
- (* ) ( ) (* ) yr y ,
where the last term on the r.h.s. is a number no larger than y*-1.  But this is impossible.
The contradiction demonstrates that lim , ht




11. There are now  two cases to consider: either
(a) 1 is not a limit point of {} ht
L , or
(b) 1 is a limit point of {} ht
L .
In case (b), for large t, the policy  Xt
L is arbitrarily close to giving all types the same total
resources, and so almost the same is spent on the education of all children, and so the
limit CV of the human-capital distribution is zero.  We will therefore complete the proof
of the theorem by showing that case (a) cannot occur.
Suppose, then, case (a).  Then for large t, ht
L is bounded away from 1 from below.
In particular, there exist types hh
21 1 <<  such that, for all large t, hh t
L <





















It follows, again by application of the argumentation of step 4, that in the limit, the
human capital possessed by the descendents of h
2
 and h
1 are different, that is:
Sh Sh •• < () () .
21
Thus, there is an interval of measure Fh Fh
01 02 () () -  that lies between the largest limit
point of the sequence {} ht




The contradiction establishes that, indeed, case (b) holds, which proves the theorem. 
Proof of Theorem 2:
The  argument preceding the statement of the theorem in the text shows that convergence
to equality occurs if and only if, for all t, the median m
t is less than the meanm
t.
(Equality of the mean and median is a singularity that we ignore.)  In period t, if the
median has been less than the mean in all prior periods, the median and mean of the
distribution are given by
km k h dF h
bb
tt
   and   Ú () ,
respectively, for some constant k.   We wish, therefore, to know if:
mh d F h
rr <Ú () (6.1)
where rb
t = ; in other words, whether
mh d F hM F
r r
r <∫ Ú (( ) )() .
1
(6.2)61
Now b<1 implies that r decreases to zero as t gets large.  It is well-known that, as r
decreases, so does  MF r()   (see Hardy, Littlewood, and Polya [1964] Theorem 192, p.
143), and further, that
lim ( ) exp( log ( ))
r r MF h d F h
Æ = Ú 0 .
(Hardy et al, Theorem 187, p, 139).   Therefore, (6.2) is true for all t ≥ 0 iff
mh d F h £ Ú exp( log ( )), or , in other words iff
log log ( ). mh d F h £Ú
This is therefore precisely the condition in which the CV of the distribution of human
capital tends to zero.         
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Figure 2   The manifold of quasi-PUNEs65
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Figure 5a    CDF of human capital after five Right victories: simulation
This is generation 5 after five Right victories







Figure 5b CDF of human capital after five Left victories: simulation
This is generation 5 after five Left victories







Laissez-faire (LF) Democracy Hotelling-Downs
politics
b+c < 1 CV Æ 0 CV Æ 0, 
faster than LF
CV Æ 0
b+c =1 constant CV  Theorem 1 Theorem 2
b+c >1 CV  explodes CV decreases to 0.4
(simulation)
if b<1:
strong skew CV 0;
otherwise, CV explodes
ﬁÆ
Table 3: Behavior of coefficient of variation of human capital by regime type70
Table 1   Coefficients of variation in six-generation simulations when b=c= 0.571
gen mean median cvar winner
0 40. 30. 0.777778 Right
1 31.4903 29.4005 0.238905 Right
2 25.5745 25.8911 0.133496 Left
3 20.6967 21.9691 0.0552047 Right
4 16.9311 18.2861 0.045739 Right
5 13.854 15.1532 0.040081 Right
6 11.3373 12.5166 0.0363719 none
gen mean median cvar winner
0 40. 30. 0.777778 Right
1 31.4903 29.4005 0.238905 Left
2 24.4413 25.8911 0.111755 Right
3 19.9764 21.7406 0.0876068 Left
4 16.026 18.1286 0.0647746 Right
5 13.1141 14.9711 0.0598669 Left
6 10.8325 12.3349 0.0400345 none
gen mean median cvar winner
0 40. 30. 0.777778 Right
1 31.4903 29.4005 0.238905 Left
2 24.4413 25.8911 0.111755 Left
3 19.401 21.7406 0.0756528 Left
4 15.6823 18.0099 0.0605814 Left
5 12.8274 14.8266 0.0492044 Right
6 10.4978 12.1695 0.0478734 none
gen mean median cvar winner
0 40. 30. 0.777778 Right
1 31.4903 29.4005 0.238905 Right
2 25.5745 25.8911 0.133496 Left
3 20.0601 21.9691 0.0825377 Right
4 16.4099 18.2861 0.0712898 Left
5 13.3159 15.1532 0.0535628 Left
6 10.9721 12.4772 0.0378218 none
gen mean median cvar winner
0 40. 30. 0.777778 Left
1 30.1078 29.4005 0.209562 Left
2 23.3832 25.3509 0.104315 Left
3 18.6632 21.1867 0.0740434 Right
4 15.2701 17.5126 0.0672418 Left
5 12.5011 14.4383 0.051507 Left
6 10.3844 11.8592 0.0346534 none
gen mean median cvar winner
0 40. 30. 0.777778 Left
1 30.1078 29.4005 0.209562 Left
2 23.3832 25.3509 0.104315 Right
3 19.1164 21.1867 0.0841093 Left
4 15.4042 17.6068 0.0640802 Right
5 12.6056 14.5167 0.0599651 Left
6 10.4662 11.9462 0.038533 none
gen mean median cvar winner
0 40. 30. 0.777778 Left
1 30.1078 29.4005 0.209562 Right
2 24.5092 25.3509 0.127354 Right
3 20.0248 21.4133 0.0967003 Right
4 16.3769 17.9313 0.0802714 Left
5 13.2326 14.9242 0.0565481 Left
6 10.8889 12.3143 0.0382226 none
gen mean median cvar winner
0 40. 30. 0.777778 Right
1 31.4903 29.4005 0.238905 Left
2 24.4413 25.8911 0.111755 Left
3 19.401 21.7406 0.0756528 Left
4 15.6823 18.0099 0.0605814 Right
5 12.8334 14.8266 0.0574073 Right
6 10.5026 12.1876 0.0552878 none
gen mean median cvar winner
0 40. 30. 0.777778 Right
1 31.4903 29.4005 0.238905 Left
2 24.4413 25.8911 0.111755 Left
3 19.401 21.7406 0.0756528 Right
4 15.8728 18.0099 0.0675324 Left
5 12.9463 14.8723 0.0520871 Right
6 10.5949 12.2253 0.0500408 none72
Table 2  Coefficients of variation when b=c= 0.75
gen mean median cvar winner
0 40. 30. 0.777778 Left
1 46.3957 40.6303 0.431824 Right
2 62.1499 57.4749 0.397763 Left
3 92.1395 94.2662 0.293562 Right
4 178.626 186.659 0.389374 Right
5 497.265 525.59 0.50656 none
gen mean median cvar winner
0 40. 30. 0.777778 Left
1 46.3957 40.6303 0.431824 Right
2 62.1499 57.4749 0.397763 Left
3 92.1395 94.2662 0.293562 Left
4 168.301 186.659 0.245359 Right
5 439.997 508.532 0.358216 none